Purges have now become a feature of Turkish politics. The latter especially sowed political instability in the late 1990s. In recent decades, Turks have had their hopes raised about EU membership and, in particular, the economy, only to have their hopes dashed. These outcomes are not unprecedented in Turkish politics. That sets up the country for a titanic struggle in which either the Nation Alliance has raised expectations too high, forcing it to back off and pay a high political price, or Turkey’s new leaders purge AKP activists within the government in order to smooth the transformation the alliance seeks. Having captured the state, neither the party’s leaders nor their activists throughout the bureaucracy and the judiciary are likely to give it up so quickly. The AKP has had 20 years to abuse Turkey’s political institutions for its benefit. Making fundamental changes to Turkey’s political institutions will not be as easy as “urgently implement … constitutional and legislative amendments,” as Kilicdaroglu and company suggest. Besides the opposition to Erdogan and the AKP, the centerpiece of the alliance’s appeal to Turks is its stated determination to shift away from the “executive presidency” that Erdogan wrought six years ago-and which greatly enhanced his power-in favor of what the Nation Alliance calls the “Strengthened Parliamentary System.” The passages on this issue get A’s for intentions but also seem woefully devoid of reality and, oddly, politics. The Nation Alliance has published a lengthy “ Memorandum of Understanding on Common Policies,” which, given the unwieldy nature of the coalition, is an ideological grab bag of initiatives with nine main sections and a variety of subsections that touch on the judiciary, mining, tourism, and much more. The other member is the religious nationalist conservative Felicity Party, which, along with the AKP, was established in 2001 after the government banned another Islamist party. In addition to Kilicdaroglu’s CHP, which occupies the left-center/social democrat and nationalist space, the alliance includes an offshoot of Turkey’s hard-right nationalists called the Good Party two center-right parties led by AKP defectors Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoglu, respectively and another center-right group, the Democrat Party. The Nation Alliance (also known as the “Table of Six”) that Kilicdaroglu leads is an ideologically disparate coalition united in their loathing of Erdogan. It is hard to tell what Kilicdaroglu and his partners believe or how they would govern. But it is unlikely that Turkey will revert to a past that never existed. Without a doubt, it will be a sigh of relief for millions of Turks if Erdogan is vanquished and relinquishes his office. What would it mean for Turkish politics and foreign policy if Kilicdaroglu won? Some Turkish and Western commentators believe Turkey can once again be democratic, prosperous, ready to pursue membership in the European Union, and better aligned with its NATO allies. Under these circumstances, it seems that only an act of God could dislodge Erdogan. Erdogan has remade the military command, which previously was loyal only to the principles of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. The judiciary that was once a redoubt of the secular nationalist establishment is now the preserve of AKP supporters. The Turkish president has used the apparatus of the state to undermine his opponents, and the vast majority of Turkey’s once boisterous, if not always responsible, media can now be relied on to recite the government line. Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have hollowed out, bent, and fashioned political institutions to ensure their grip on power. This is perhaps a lack of imagination, but he has been in power-first as prime minister and then as president-since 2003. Yet even with Kilicdaroglu’s commanding lead, it seems hard to believe that Erdogan will lose. With just a month to go before the election, Kilicdaroglu is up by between 7 and 10 points. Read more of FP ’s coverage of Turkey’s pivotal elections.Īnd so it goes with Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and a six-party coalition’s pick to challenge Erdogan for the presidency on May 14. After a few paragraphs, it was clear that the Times editorial board knew that it disliked Erdogan more than it knew about Ince and his views.

During Turkey’s 2018 presidential election campaign, the New York Times ran an editorial expressing support for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s opponent at the time, Muharrem Ince.

Nytimes election website